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BACKGROUND: Autism is characterized by impairments of social interaction, but the underlying subpersonal
processes are still a matter of controversy. It has been suggested that the autistic spectrum might be characterized
by alterations of the brain’s inference on the causes of socially relevant signals. However, it is unclear at what level of
processing such trait-related alterations may occur.
METHODS: We used a reward-based learning task that requires the integration of nonsocial and social cues in
conjunction with computational modeling. Healthy subjects (N 5 36) were selected based on their Autism Quotient
Spectrum (AQ) score, and AQ scores were assessed for correlations with model parameters and task scores.
RESULTS: Individual differences in AQ were inversely correlated with participants’ task scores (r 5 2.39, 95%
conﬁdence interval [CI] [2.68, 2.13]). Moreover, AQ scores were signiﬁcantly correlated with a social weighting
parameter that indicated how strongly the decision was inﬂuenced by the social cue (r 5 2.42, 95% CI [2.66, 2.19]),
but not with other model parameters. Also, more pronounced social weighting was related to higher scores (r 5 .50,
95% CI [.20, .86]).
CONCLUSIONS: Our results demonstrate that higher autistic traits in healthy subjects are related to lower scores in
a learning task that requires social cue integration. Computational modeling further demonstrates that these trait-
related performance differences are not explained by an inability to process the social stimuli and its causes, but
rather by the extent to which participants take into account social information during decision making.
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Biohttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2015.11.025Autism is characterized by profound impairments of social
interaction and communication. These difﬁculties are thought
to be related across the diagnostic divide to autistic trait–
related differences in social perceptual or cognitive abilities (1).
It has become clear in recent years that a striking dissociation
exists between relatively intact explicit and severely impaired
implicit social abilities (2). In other words, high-functioning
individuals with autism learn to explicitly think about other
persons’ mental states, yet they still ﬁnd it very difﬁcult to
engage in real-time social interactions with people without
autism (3,4). Exactly which subpersonal processes show
autistic trait–related differences and could explain everyday
life social impairments is still a matter of substantial contro-
versy. Recent studies have provided evidence that many
putatively relevant processes, such as action perception, are
intact in autism (5). Still, individuals with autism have striking
impairments in social situations in everyday life, which raises
the question of which and how processes other than basic
perceptual mechanisms may come into play (6).
A currently prominent theoretical suggestion includes the
assumption that the autistic spectrum might be speciﬁcally& 2016 Society of Biological Psychiatry. This is an open access a
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SEE COMMENTARcharacterized by deﬁcits of predictive coding or Bayesian
inference (7,8). Predictive coding formulations of perception
propose that expectations in higher brain areas generate top-
down predictions that meet bottom-up, stimulus-related sig-
nals from lower sensory areas. The discrepancy between
actual sensory input and predictions of that input is described
as a prediction error. With regard to autism, it has been
proposed that autistic traits might be related to higher sensory
precision (i.e., a stronger reliance on [bottom-up] sensory
evidence as opposed to [top-down] prior beliefs), which can
lead to a failure of automatically contextualizing sensory
information in an optimal and socially adequate fashion
(9,10). Furthermore, the reliance on prior beliefs rather than
sensory information might be particularly relevant in situations
of high uncertainty, such as direct social interactions with
others, as social agents are arguably the most difﬁcult “things”
to predict (10). This theoretical proposition resonates with
clinical descriptions of patients with autism as having a
particular dislike for situations of direct social interaction with
others, whereas situations of social observation are described
as less difﬁcult (4).rticle under the
-nd/4.0/).
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perceptual processes in autism, it might be precisely the
integration of bottom-up and top-down processes during
social interactions and exploitation of social cues provided
by others during decision making that could be particularly
relevant to understanding the social impairments in autism. In
other words, although autistic traits may not be associated
with disturbances of basic perceptual and learning processes,
it is conceivable that such traits may affect whether and to
what extent social information inﬂuences decision making and
what behavior is actually shown. From a predictive coding
perspective, there are two possible pathologies. There could
be deﬁcits in predicting and inferring the mental states of
others, or, alternatively, these inferences could be unable to
inﬂuence behavior because they are afforded an impoverished
weight or precision.
Recent progress in computational modeling has demon-
strated that Bayesian models can be used to formally inves-
tigate perceptual and cognitive mechanisms that underlie
social behavior when explicit social advice is provided to
study participants (11). In particular, it has been shown that
humans employ hierarchical generative models to make
inferences about the changing intentions of others when
attention is explicitly directed toward them and that they
integrate estimates of advice accuracy (i.e., the correctness
of the advice, which can be valid or misleading depending on
the conﬂicting interests of the players) with nonsocial sources
of information when making decisions. In Bayesian terms, this
integration corresponds to an optimal weighting of prosocial
and nonsocial cues in terms of their relative precision when
making decisions.
In the present study, we build on this research by applying
hierarchical Bayesian modeling to behavioral data from a novel
version of a probabilistic learning paradigm. This paradigm
included a social gaze cue about whose relevance no explicit
information was provided in order to investigate autistic trait–
related differences in the extent to which healthy individuals
integrate and use this piece of social information during task
performance. We hypothesized that autistic traits are related
to differences in the extent to which individuals are inﬂuenced
by social cues (i.e., their precision), rather than a general
inability to process social cues and their putatively underlying
mental states. On the behavioral level, this hypothesis should
result in higher total task scores for individuals lower in autistic
traits, as they should be more easily able to exploit the
additional social information. In terms of the underlying
cognitive processes, we hypothesized that this behavioral
advantage might be subserved by differences in the effect
that social information has on decision making, which would
be inversely related to autistic traits. We further predicted that
using the social cue should be more difﬁcult under volatile
conditions and differentially so for individuals with higher
autistic traits.METHODS AND MATERIALS
Participants
In light of evidence suggesting that autistic traits are distrib-
uted as a continuum across the general population and areBiologicalknown to show identical etiology across the diagnostic divide
(1), we chose to study healthy participants based on their
score on the German translation of the Autism Quotient
Spectrum (AQ) questionnaire (12). This experimental approach
of studying autistic traits in neurotypical subjects makes it
possible to make inferences about the etiology of autistic traits
without potential confounds from various comorbid conditions
often noted in patients with autistic spectrum disorders. To
capture the extremes of the distribution and have a balanced
proportion of participants with high and low AQ scores, 36
subjects were prescreened and invited to participate based on
their AQ scores up to 25 (19 men; age range, 20–37 years;
mean age 26.25 years). It has been shown that AQ has good
discriminative validity at a threshold of 26 (13). Participants did
not have any history of neurologic and psychiatric disorders
and were recruited by using a preexisting database of the Max
Planck Institute for Metabolic Research comprising healthy
native German volunteers. The distribution of AQ scores was
as follows: range, 7–23; mean 15.72; SD 5.09. All partici-
pants gave informed consent before the beginning of the
experiment.Experimental Paradigm
The card game used in our study, which had been originally
designed as two cards with associated winning probabilities
(14,15), was combined with a face cue presented in the center
of the screen (Figure 1A). The eye gaze direction of the face
was manipulated to change during each trial and to be
directed toward one of the cards before participants were
allowed to make their choice. As a result, two things needed to
be learned in the task: ﬁrst, whether the reward is associated
with the green card or the blue card; second, whether the gaze
shift is directed toward the card that is rewarded. The
probability of whether or not the face actually looked toward
the winning card on a given trial (i.e., gaze accuracy) was
systematically manipulated in accordance with a probabilistic
schedule as well (Supplement). Both the card and the gaze
accuracies were varied independently of one another
(Figure 1B, C). The phases in which the trials have cues with
unstable accuracy are referred to as volatile phases. In the ﬁrst
half of the experiment (trials 1–60), card accuracy was stable
and high, whereas in the second half (trials 60–120), it followed
a volatile phase. For the gaze accuracy, the volatile phase took
place during trials 30–70. The probabilistic schedule for the
gaze accuracy was reversed for half of the subjects to avoid
block order effects. Positions of the cards (left or right) were
determined randomly.
In the instructions, subjects were informed about the cards’
having winning probabilities, which could change during the
experiment and which were independent of the reward
magnitude that was displayed on them. On each trial, there
would be only one correct card, and if subjects chose the
correct card, they would receive the score (random numbers
between 1 and 9) that had been displayed on it. Subjects were
instructed that they would earn an extra amount of money
depending on their score at the end of the experiment. Finally,
participants were informed about the presence of a face on the
screen, which was explained by stating that it was supposed
to make the visual display “more interesting.” Participants didPsychiatry July 15, 2016; 80:112–119 www.sobp.org/journal 113
Figure 1. The experimental design.
(A) Subjects can make a choice once
the lines on both cards disappear. If
the choice is right on that trial, a green
tick is displayed, and the reward value
of the right card is added to the total
score. If the choice is wrong, a red
cross is displayed, and the score
remains the same. Probability sche-
dules: (B) probability of the blue card
being correct (i.e., card accuracy) and
(C) probability of the gaze showing
the correct card (i.e., gaze accuracy).
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experiment, subjects ﬁlled out a brief questionnaire.
Perceptual and Response Models
The “observing the observer” approach provides a complete
mapping from experimental stimuli to observed responses by
inverting the perceptual model and the response model (16).
An extension of this approach is a generative model called
hierarchical Gaussian ﬁltering (HGF), which accounts for
deterministic and probabilistic relationships between the envi-
ronment and perceptual states (17). We used a perceptual-
response model pair to infer subjects’ beliefs about the stimuli.
We modeled congruency of response with advice (i.e., the
advice given by the social cue [the gaze]), using HGF
combined with a response model as implemented by Diac-
onescu et al. (11); Figure 2 is a graphic representation. This
approach allows the estimation of hierarchically coupled
hidden states that describe subjects’ learning about the
environmental statistics—the probability and the volatility of
the card and gaze cues—based on their responses. These
subjective beliefs are weighted by their precision to form the
basis of a response model (of the observed behavior) as
explained in detail subsequently. The Supplement contains a
detailed description of the perceptual models used here.
Precision Weighted Response Model. We applied the
HGF to derive subject-speciﬁc accuracy and volatility esti-
mates for card and gaze in a parallel manner. On a given trial,114 Biological Psychiatry July 15, 2016; 80:112–119 www.sobp.org/jot, subjects generated a combined belief, bðtÞ, after weighting
the posterior expectation of inferred card and gaze accuracies,
μ
ðtÞ
1;card and μ
tð Þ
1; gaze, to generate actions in the following
manner:
wðtÞgaze 5
ζπðtÞ1;gaze
ζπðtÞ1;gaze1π
ðtÞ
1;card
; wðtÞcard 5
π
ðtÞ
1;card
ζπðtÞ1;gaze1π
ðtÞ
1;card
(1)
bðtÞ 5 wðtÞgaze μ
ðtÞ
1;gaze1w
ðtÞ
card μ
ðtÞ
1;card (2)
where wgaze and wcard are effective precisions of gaze and
card cues, ζ is the weight on the precision of inferred gaze
accuracy or the additional bias toward the social cue, and
π
ðtÞ
1;gaze and π
ðtÞ
1;card are precisions (inverse variances) at the ﬁrst
level for gaze and card accuracies, respectively. Because the
ﬁrst-level estimates are assumed to follow a Bernoulli distri-
bution, one can calculate the precision at each trial by
π
ðtÞ
1;gaze 5
1
μ
ðtÞ
1;gaze ð12μðtÞ1;gazeÞ
; πðtÞ1;card 5
1
μ
ðtÞ
1;cardð12μðtÞ1;cardÞ
(3)
The probability of taking the gaze advice was assumed to
be a unit square sigmoid function:
p yðtÞ 5 1jbðtÞ  5 ðbðtÞÞβ=ððbðtÞÞβ1ð12bðtÞÞβÞ (4)
where β is a function of the third-level volatility estimate or μ3:
β 5 exp 2μ tð Þ3;gaze
 
1expð2μ tð Þ3;cardÞ (5)urnal
Figure 2. Graphic depiction of two parallel learning systems that were
assumed to inﬂuence the choice behavior. For any trial t, x3
(t) follows a
Gaussian random walk such that p xðtÞ3
 
 N x t21ð Þ3 ; θ
 
. The ﬁrst level
state variable, xðtÞ1 , is the accuracy at that trial and is a sigmoid transform of the
second level state variable, xðtÞ2 , which also follows a Gaussian distribution:
N x t21ð Þ2 ; exp κx tð Þ3 1ω
  
, where the variance term includes two parameters:
ω is the ﬁxed component of the step size variance, and κ accounts for the
coupling between the third and the second levels. The response model
parameter ζ represents the weight on the precision of the inferred gaze
accuracy.
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hidden states causing the sensory inputs. Maximum a poste-
riori estimates of the parameters are obtained using an
approximate variational Bayesian scheme. It can be down-
loaded as a part of the TAPAS software collection (http://www.
translationalneuromodeling.org/tapas/). The update equations
take the form of precision-weighted prediction errors following
a form similar to an extended Kalman ﬁlter and are hence
analytically trackable. Beliefs at every level in the hierarchy are
updated with a step size equivalent to the prediction error
times a ratio of precisions (precision of the data in the
numerator and precision of the prediction in the denominator).
For details of the updated equations and the variational
Bayesian inversion scheme, see Mathys et al. (17) and
Daunizeau et al. (16). All parameters (θgaze, θcard, κgaze, κcard,
ωgaze, ωcard, ζ) and state variables were estimated for each
subject by using a quasi-Newton minimization algorithm as
implemented in HGF version 3 running on MATLAB 7.12
(The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts).
Given that we assumed the autistic spectrum to be
characterized by differences in the extent to which individuals
weight social information rather than an inability to process
social information, we predicted that autistic traits (as meas-
ured by AQ scores) would be associated with the degree to
which individuals weight the gaze cue while making decisions.Table 1. Descriptive Data of Participants
AQ Group No. Subjects Sex, M/F Age, Years
High AQ 18 9/9 25.5 6 .7
Low AQ 18 10/8 27 6 1
Data are given as n or mean 6 SEM.
AQ, Autism Quotient Spectrum; EQ, empathy quotient; F, female; M, m
BiologicalMore precisely, the model parameter ζ was expected to be
negatively correlated with AQ scores. Therefore, a large value
of ζ signals that a participant preferentially bases his or her
decisions on the social advice (i.e., the gaze cue) compared
with other cues during decision making. To test the associa-
tion of autistic traits with the extent of processing and
weighting the gaze cue, we applied a multivariate regression
analysis on the AQ scores by using the model parameters of
the winning model as predictors (see later for model space).
Because the parameter ζ is estimated in log space, we
included it in the regression in log space as well. We
performed all correlations with bootstrapping (2000 boot-
straps) and 95% conﬁdence intervals (CIs). To demonstrate
the speciﬁcity of the signiﬁcant predictors to the AQ scores,
we performed a full model analysis including the following
other variables: sex, age, systemizing quotient, empathy
quotient, and IQ (verbal) scores (Table 1).
In addition to this original model (model 1), we included a
second model to test if the subjects did not take the gaze
accuracy into account when making decisions (model 2). A
third model that includes a perceptual model with ﬁxed
parameters paired with a decision noise response model
was also included (model 3) (Supplement).
Other Behavioral Measures
We assessed the relationship between AQ scores and indi-
vidual total task scores as the ability to exploit the additional
social information to contribute to task performance. It is
possible that the volatility of the input structure may inﬂuence
subjects’ inference about the advice validity and subsequent
decision to take the advice into account that would inﬂuence
the scores obtained. The inﬂuence of probability (high vs. low)
and volatility (stable vs. volatile) of the gaze cue on the
performance was evaluated and compared between two AQ
groups, which were obtained using a median split procedure
(median AQ 5 15). The association between autistic traits and
advice-taking behavior on volatile low-probability gaze cue
trials was evaluated separately by means of correlation
analyses.RESULTS
Model Comparison
The model selection is based on the model evidence, which is
a principled measure of the balance between model ﬁt and
model complexity (18). Model comparison was in favor of
model 1 (exceedance probability of .9408), suggesting that a
hierarchical Bayesian model in which participants weighted
both social and reward-related information best described
subjects’ responses. The exceedance probabilities for model 2AQ SQ EQ IQ (Verbal)
20.4 6 .5 27.1 6 2 41.1 6 2.1 101.9 6 2.1
11.1 6 .4 23.9 6 2.1 44.3 6 2.6 103.2 6 2.7
ale; SQ, systemizing quotient.
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Figure 3. Relationship of total scores, Autism Quotient Spectrum (AQ) and ζ. (Left panel) Negative correlation between ζ parameter and AQ traits (r 5 2.42,
95% conﬁdence interval [CI] [2.66, 2.19]). (Middle panel) Negative relationship between subjects’ AQ traits and their score at the end of the task (r 5 2.36,
95% CI [2.68, 2.13]). (Right panel) Positive correlation between total score and ζ parameter (r 5 .5, 95% CI [.20, .86]).
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evaluated performance of the three models with balanced
accuracy. We observed a balanced accuracy of .61 for model
1, the winning model; .54 for model 2; and .58 for model 3,
further corroborating our ﬁndings.
Model Parameters as Predictors of AQ Scores
A multivariate regression was conducted to investigate an
assumed relationship of gaze-cue related model parameters
(θgaze, κgaze, ωgaze, ζ) of the winning model and AQ scores. The
analysis shows that ζ values (i.e., weighting the gaze) did
signiﬁcantly predict the AQ scores (β 5 21.60, t31 5 22.77,
p 5 .0095). Other parameters—θgaze (β 5 12.37, not signiﬁ-
cant), κgaze (β 5 2.66, not signiﬁcant), and ωgaze (β 5 2.18,
not signiﬁcant)—were not signiﬁcant predictors (F4,31 5 2.02,116 Biological Psychiatry July 15, 2016; 80:112–119 www.sobp.org/joR2 5 .21). Because negative coefﬁcients in the multivariate
regression analysis do not mean that there actually is a
negative correlation between the response and the predictor,
we investigated the direction of the association between AQ
scores and the advice weighting parameter ζ by performing a
correlation analysis (Figure 3, left panel). The Pearson corre-
lation coefﬁcient between ζ and AQ scores was 2.42 (95% CI
[2.66, 2.19]).
To address the speciﬁcity of ζ to AQ scores, we performed
a full model: a multivariate regression analysis including
explanatory variables of AQ, IQ, systemizing quotient, empa-
thy quotient, age, and sex was used to predict the social gaze
weighting parameter (ζ). The analysis shows that only AQ
scores signiﬁcantly predicted the parameter ζ (β 5 2.11, t31 5
22.18, p 5 .037). The other descriptive scores—IQ (β 5 .02,Figure 4. Inﬂuence of structure of
the environment on the behavior. (A)
Scores obtained by high and low
Autism Quotient Spectrum (AQ)
groups in different phases of the
experiment based on the features of
the gaze cue (high 3 low gaze accu-
racy and stable 3 volatile periods of
gaze accuracy). (B) Difference is sig-
niﬁcant (*p 5 .034) in the volatile low
accuracy phase (circled area). (C)
During the same phase, the number
of trials in which the subjects took the
advice (i.e., chose the card that is
indicated by the highly misleading
gaze) was correlated with AQ traits
(r 5 .52, 95% conﬁdence interval
[.29, .75]).
urnal
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systemizing quotient (β 5 .003, not signiﬁcant), age (β 5 .09,
not signiﬁcant), and sex (βmale 5 .46, not signiﬁcant)—were not
signiﬁcant predictors (F6,29 5 1.814, R
2 5 .27).
Relationship of Total Scores, AQ, and ζ
Individual differences in AQ scores were signiﬁcantly corre-
lated with participants’ total scores (r 5 2.39, 95% CI [2.68,
2.13]) (Figure 3, middle panel). Also, a relationship between
total scores and ζ was observed such that a more pronounced
weighting of advice was related to higher total scores (r 5 .50,
95% CI [.20, .86]) (Figure 3, right panel).
Association Between AQ Scores and the Utility of
Misleading Advice in a Volatile Environment
Figure 4A illustrates the performance in each phase of the
gaze accuracy. As expected, when the gaze accuracy is
volatile, it is difﬁcult to learn—hence yielding lower scores.
Moreover, we observed a signiﬁcant difference between two
groups during the volatile low probability phase (Welch’s t test
[t33 5 2.21, p 5 .034]). These phases are highlighted with
circles in Figure 4B. Similarly, AQ correlated with the number
of trials where the subjects took the advice (r5 .52, 95% CI [.29,
.75]) in the same phase (Figure 4C). Therefore, even during the
volatile phases of the experiment, the low AQ group was able to
take advantage of misleading advice by avoiding it.DISCUSSION
In this study, we applied hierarchical Bayesian modeling to
investigate autistic trait–related differences in the extent to
which healthy individuals integrate and make use of gaze cues
in a probabilistic reward learning task. For optimal perform-
ance, our task required following both the card and the gaze
cues and combining these two sources of information, even
though instructions provided very little information about the
nature and relevance of the gaze cues, in contrast to other
studies using explicit forms of social advice (11,14). As
expected, our results demonstrate an inverse relationship
between autistic traits and total task scores obtained by study
participants, such that individuals higher in autistic traits
obtained lower total task scores.
To provide a mechanistic explanation for such autistic trait–
related differences in performance, we applied computational
modeling to the behavioral data. We were interested to model
perceptual as well as higher-order processing of both card
and gaze cues and, in particular, their relationship to action
selection (i.e., the extent to which individuals were actually
biased by the social information provided on a trial-by-trial
basis). Results of our computational analyses demonstrate
striking evidence for autistic trait–related differences, such that
individuals lower in autistic traits are inﬂuenced more by the
gaze cue, as indicated by a negative relationship between the
response model parameter ζ and autistic traits. Our results
also show a positive relationship between ζ and the total
individual scores obtained in the experiment, which indicates
that reliance on the social information was actually what was
helping subjects lower in autistic traits to obtain higher scores.
Furthermore, our results indicate that individuals high inBiologicalautistic traits had particular difﬁculties using the social advice
under volatile conditions.
By providing these striking new insights into autistic trait–
related differences in social cognition, we believe that our
study is most relevant to current discussions concerned with
mechanistic explanations of autism. Predictive coding theories
have reconstructed autism in terms of high-level attenuated
precisions relative to sensory precision (9), which results in an
enhanced weighting of prediction errors (10) and a loss of the
selective force when processing a context with multiple cues
(19). In the present study, Bayesian models provide an
important avenue (7) that can help identify whether autistic
trait–associated alterations lie in the reliance on prior knowl-
edge or the optimal update of prior information during learning.
In our Bayesian formulation, we addressed this issue by
assessing possible relationships of perceptual and response
model parameters with autistic traits. However, no relationship
between the perceptual model parameters and these traits
was found, which is suggestive of an intact inference machi-
nery. However, the response model parameter ζ, which
constitutes the weight on the precision of inferred gaze
probability, reﬂected that participants who scored higher on
the autism questionnaire could not take advantage of the
learned precision estimates of the social cue when mapping
representations to beliefs. Taken together, these results
suggest that the mechanisms of estimating the precision of
social information do not differ, but that the application of new,
updated priors depends on the level of autistic traits. These
ﬁndings appear consistent with a recent suggestion by Palmer
et al. (20), who proposed that autism may not impair the ability
to process social information per se, but rather lead to
differences in how the relevant representations are weighted
for action selection.
In light of other propositions, which hold that autistic trait–
related impairments of social cognition may be particularly
relevant in complex and unpredictable situations (19), we
further investigated whether autistic traits were also related
to task performance during phases of the experiment, which
included volatile and misleading gaze cues. Our data show
that this particularly unstable environment made it more
difﬁcult for subjects with higher autistic traits to use the social
cue while making decisions. This kind of inﬂuence of volatility
on behavior parallels results from previous studies, which
report that an unpredictable context makes it more difﬁcult for
individuals with autism to use social cues in an appropriate
way (21). Therefore, our ﬁnding can be seen as evidence for
difﬁculties in contextualizing social cues in light of high
uncertainty.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst to use a
hierarchical Bayesian model in the context of autistic traits.
The modeling approach that we implemented here is a
promising method for capturing individual differences in the
learning and integration of social information. Given the
heterogeneity of the population, this could be particularly
useful for identifying subgroups that may map onto distinct
mechanisms of impaired social interaction in autism. The
“observing the observer” approach has been demonstrated
to be useful for inference in hidden states and parameters that
shape interindividual differences in learning (22). Hierarchical
Bayesian models of learning such as the HGF linked to actionPsychiatry July 15, 2016; 80:112–119 www.sobp.org/journal 117
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contexts (11,23,24). Our results indicate that Bayesian models
may be particularly powerful in providing mechanistic explan-
ations of social difﬁculties, which are particularly relevant to an
understanding of psychiatric disorders (4,25,26). Advances
in computational psychiatry (27–30) and studies such as
this one could contribute to mechanistic formulations of
psychopathology.
We cannot rule out intact precision-weighted prediction
error processing in patients with autism, as our sample
comprised healthy subjects. Also, one can speculate that in
a sample comprising patients with autism, impaired inference
about the social cue in addition to the reduced reliance on it
could be observed. Therefore, future research should include
testing patients with a formal diagnosis of autism to explore
whether the observed differences hold across the entire
spectrum. Furthermore, the experimental paradigm introduced
here and our analytic approach could be used together with
neuroimaging to investigate which activity and connectivity
proﬁles in brain regions relevant for social cognition underlie
the observed autistic trait–related behavioral differences.
In conclusion, taken together, the results of our study
demonstrate autistic trait–related behavioral differences in a
task that requires the integration of nonsocial and social
information. Using hierarchical Bayesian modeling, we show
that these performance differences are not subserved by
impairments of basic perceptual and learning processes,
which is consistent with recent ﬁndings in autism (5), but are
rather related to the extent to which individuals are actually
inﬂuenced by the social information during decision making. In
other words, autistic traits may not impair the ability to
process social information per se, but rather by a low
weighting or precision of social cues during decision making.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND DISCLOSURES
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